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Parliamentary debates about the resolution of the EU debt crisis seem to provide a good 
example for the frequently assumed “politicizationˮ of European governance. Against this 
background, the paper argues that in order to make sense of this assumption, a clearer 
differentiation of three thematic focal points of controversies – with regard to the assessment 
of government leadership, concerning the debate between competing party ideologies within 
the left/right dimension, and with regard to the assessment of supranational integration – is 
needed. Applying this threefold distinction, the paper uses a theory of differential 
Europeanization to explain differences in the thematic structure of debates in the Austrian 
Nationalrat, the British House of Commons, and the German Bundestag. Empirically, the 
paper is based on data gained from the computer-based coding of plenary debates about the 
resolution of the European debt crisis between 2010 and 2011.  
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1. Introduction  
Parliamentary debates about the handling of the European debt crisis provide an unusually 
clear example of politically salient and polarized public controversies about a relevant aspect 
of European policy-making. As these debates make headline news and are seen to test both 
the stability of coalition governments and the limits of the domestic party political consensus 
in favor of the EU, they appear to fuel the assumption of a “politicizationˮ of European 
integration (for discussions of this term in the context of the EU, cp. Bartolini/Hix 2006, de 
Wilde 2011, Hooghe/Marks 2008).  
 
Using these debates as an example for the politicization of European integration appears 
problematic, however, without a clarification of the thematic focal points of controversies and 
the way in which these relate to decision-making about the future evolution of European 
Monetary Union. In this sense, parliamentary controversies involve three main elements that 
relate in quite different ways to a contestation of supranational integration. Firstly, the 
principal task of parliaments is to hold domestic executives to account and to scrutinize their 
actions in the context of EU decision-making. Linked to this task are debates about issues of 
government leadership, particularly the clarity and success of negotiation strategies of 
government representatives in EU decision-making and the transparency and accountability of 
its behavior towards parliament. Most formal rules of parliamentary scrutiny in the context of 
European affairs relate to this set of tasks (O`Brennan/Raunio 2007, Benz/Auel 2005). 
Arguably, this aspect of the debate does not involve a questioning of European integration or 
EU institutions, but relates to the question how well and how legitimately the country is 
represented by its government.  
 
Secondly, parliaments are an important arena of debate between political parties with 
competing ideological views. In this context, several authors in the literature have argued that 
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the main cleavage of domestic party politics between left and right also emerges in debates 
about European affairs, prompting debates between proponents of “regulated capitalism 
versus neoliberalismˮ (Hooghe et al. 2004, for a detailed elaboration of this argument cp. also 
Hix 2006, Hix et al. 2007, Hix 2008). The debate about the resolution of the European debt 
crisis appears as a plausible candidate for the emergence of such debates, as both the conduct 
of crisis management and the future reform of EMU involves questions of distribution (both 
between countries and social groups), market regulation (particularly with regard to the 
financial sector), and the management of the economy. The emergence of such debates, 
however, should not be confused with the contestation of the existence of European 
integration or EMU, but appears as a directional debate that relates to the choice of rules and 
instruments for the future governance of the Eurozone. 
 
Finally, the evolution of the debt crisis may prompt parliamentary controversies about the 
supranational framework of European Monetary Union, particularly the design of institutions, 
the appropriateness and effectiveness of decisions taken at the European level and the general 
evaluation of supranational governance. This aspect of debates arguably represents the most 
direct form of a politicization of EU governance, as supranational arrangements and decisions 
are directly called into question and debated as a contested object of political controversy. It 
can be assumed that this kind of debate does not coincide with the socio-economic dimension 
of political conflict between left and right, but relates to a different dimension between 
proponents of Euro-skeptic views and those in favor of increased supranational integration. 
This assumption is based on the argument found in the literature about the party politics of 
European integration that the sovereignty/integration dimension is both analytically and 
empirically unrelated to the left/right dimension (Hix/Lord 1997, Marks/Steenbergen 2004).  
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What kind of debate emerges in actual deliberations of domestic parliaments about the 
resolution of the European debt crisis? Setting this question in a comparative perspective, the 
paper asks to what degree the three thematic aspects of debates discussed above are contested 
in parliamentary debates in Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the paper 
seeks to show how a theory of differential Europeanization can be used to explain differences 
in the thematic structure observed in a comparison of these debates. In this sense, it is argued 
that the degree of involvement of national governments in decision-making of the Eurozone, 
along with domestic institutional and party political variables, can be seen to influence the 
way in which the evolution of the European debt crisis is debated.  
 
The paper is organized in three main parts. The following part (2) explains the theoretical 
framework and shows how a theory of differential Europeanization can be adapted to the 
analysis of parliamentary debates. The subsequent part (3) deals with the selection of data and 
the methodical approach of the paper. The empirical findings are then presented in two steps 
through an empirical survey and the discussion of the three case studies (part 4), before the 
main results are summarized in the conclusion (part 5).  
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
This paper builds on a theory of differential Europeanization to develop assumptions about 
the different responses of domestic parliaments to the evolution of the European debt crisis. 
The rationalist version of this particular theory – which is also frequently labelled as a 
“goodness of fitˮ approach to the analysis of Europeanization – uses three variables to explain 
the different responses of Member States to policies and institutions of the European Union: 
Firstly, it is assumed that supranational decisions adopted at the EU level create adaptational 
pressures on domestic political systems by offering some actors additional political and legal 
resources while constraining the access to these resources for other actors and thus affecting 
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their ability to pursue the realization of their goals (Börzel 2005: 52). Importantly, the effect 
of the European Union as an opportunity structure that affects the action capacity of domestic 
political actors is expected to vary significantly between Member States, depending on what 
kind of opportunities and constraints are imposed on political actors at the domestic level. In 
this sense, European decisions may be in line with domestic arrangements and therefore 
prompt no shift of resources. In the case of a “mismatchˮ between EU requirements and 
national politics, however, it is assumed that opportunities for the empowerment of a specific 
set of actors in relation to others are created, thus prompting political conflicts in favor of 
change. Secondly, however, it is assumed that the adaptational pressure created by the EU is 
not directly translated into change at the domestic level but mediated through the institutional 
setting of the respective national political system. In this sense, domestic institutions can 
either provide a facilitating setting for domestic political actors to exploit opportunities 
created through EU decisions, or establish access points for veto players that prohibit the 
pursuit of these opportunities. Finally, the specific constellation of actors dealing with the 
transposition of adaptational pressures from the EU into domestic decisions is assumed to 
affect the intensity of political conflicts resulting from these pressures and the way in which 
they are translated into specific decisions. Depending on the interests and political resources 
of participating actors, the adoption of domestic decisions required through EU rules may 
either proceed consensually, result in extended domestic battles over change or prompt the 
emergence of a strong coalition of veto players prohibiting such adaptation. Depending on the 
country-specific “mismatchˮ as the independent variable and the specific constellation of 
actors and institutions as intervening variables, therefore, the response to EU decisions at the 
level of domestic politics is expected to vary widely, ranging from inertia or retrenchment to 
adaptation or even transformation (Börzel 2005: 58-61). 
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In existing research, this approach has mostly been used to explain the persistence and change 
of policies and institutions of Member States in relation to the European Union. As the 
following paragraphs will try to show, the combination of three elements – a reflection of the 
country-specific link between supranational decision-making and domestic politics, and the 
respective context of actors and institutions in the various Member States – establish a useful 
framework to reflect on the likely evolution of parliamentary debate about the EU debt crisis.  
 
In order to adapt the theoretical framework to the topic discussed here, the paper starts from 
the idea that parliaments establish an institutionalized setting for the interaction of two sets of 
actors: the representatives of the domestic government on the one hand, and speakers of 
parliamentary parties with both different ideological orientations and political affiliations to 
the government majority or parliamentary opposition, on the other. Applying the first variable 
– i.e., the differential empowerment of domestic actors through EU decisions – the question 
arises how the balance of political resources between the government and parliamentary 
parties is affected by European decision-making within the debt crisis. For governments, 
decision-making at the EU level offers both opportunities, particularly the incentive to 
articulate preferences for the future development of EMU and to pursue them through their 
exclusive access to the European Council (i.e., their role as “policy shapersˮ), and constraints, 
particularly the obligation to explain and legitimize potentially costly and unpopular decisions 
related to the establishment of EU rescue funds (i.e., their role as “policy takersˮ). 
Parliamentary parties, by contrast, face constraints through the restriction of access to and 
information about EU decision-making in the context of the debt crisis, while opportunities 
are established mainly through the possibility of criticizing the behavior of government and 
mobilizing voters through public debate about EU decision-making. Decision-making in the 
context of the EU debt crisis, in short, is seen to affect the distribution of legal and political 
resources between government and parliamentary parties.  
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In this context, the aim of the paper is not make some kind of objective assessment of the shift 
of resources between government and parliamentary parties affected by EU decision-making. 
Instead, the main theoretical argument made here is that the emergence of incentives and 
constraints discussed above is likely to become a subject of parliamentary debates about the 
resolution of the EU debt crisis. The mismatch between EU decisions and domestic politics, 
therefore, is not understood as an objective factor but as a shift of power and resources that is 
both discursively constructed and politically contested in the parliamentary debates. In this 
sense, the approach adopted here takes seriously the argument that “the degree to which 
‘misfit’ results in political pressures for adaptation is itself subject to meaning construction in 
discursive processesˮ (Börzel/Risse 2007: 292). 
 
Used in a comparative context, the main theoretical value of this approach is to reflect on the 
different degree to which EU decision-making is likely to be perceived as affecting the 
distribution of legal and political resources between government and parliamentary parties in 
the various Member States. In this context, an important observation is that the role of 
governments both as “policy shapersˮ and “policy takersˮ in the context of the EU debt crisis 
differs depending on the country’s membership in the Eurozone, the relative political weight 
of a government in the decision-making of the European Council, and the size of potentially 
costly obligations accepted by a government for the resolution of the debt crisis. In this sense, 
national governments can act in a role as active “pace settersˮ for the development of means 
of crisis management and forthcoming reform of EMU, passive “foot draggersˮ of 
forthcoming payments and risks that they have little chance to influence, or as neutral “fence 
sittersˮ who are not greatly involved in what form of crisis management is discussed in the 
Eurozone (for this typology, cp. Börzel 2002). Against this background, the argument 
suggested here is that the role of government in the resolution of the EU debt crisis is likely to 
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affect the evolution of parliamentary debate: A more prominent role of the domestic executive 
in EU decision-making is likely to prompt a stronger focus of debates on its course of action 
and the potential constraints faced by parliamentary parties that are not directly involved in 
negotiations at the EU level. In this sense, particularly the behavior of “policy-shapingˮ 
governments is likely to become a focal point of debates, as government representatives 
present their preferences for the future development of EMU, and parliamentary parties 
engage in a party political debate of these options and ask for the enactment of rights of 
parliamtary information and scrutiny. In this context, supranational developments are likely to 
be discussed by reference to the preferences of the domestic government, as EU decision-
making is perceived not to be imposed but to be influenced and shaped by the representatives 
of the national executive. By contrast, a “fence sittingˮ government provides fewer incentives 
for parliamentary party to engage in debates about its course of action, suggesting that a 
debate will take place that is more detached from the particular actions of the domestic 
government and focuses more strongly on the views of parliamentary parties on supranational 
developments. The presence of a “policy-takingˮ government in parliament is likely to lead to 
a mixed debate both about domestic and supranational aspects of decision-making, as both the 
constraints imposed by EU decisions and the ability of the domestic government to defend 
and legitimize those constraints are likely to move to the forefront of controversies. 
Summarizing this argument, it is assumed that the involvement of national governments in the 
governance of the Eurozone shapes parliamentary debate, leading to debates with a more 
pronounced focus on the domestic executive in the case of a “policy-shapingˮ involvement, 
“supranationalizedˮ debates in the case of a detachment of the domestic government from the 
Eurozone, and mixed debates in the case of mainly reactive “policy-takingˮ governments.  
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Considering the two intervening variables of the theoretical model discussed above, it appears 
probable that both the institutional setting and the specific constellation of parliamentary 
parties are likely to affect the thematic structure of the debate.  
 
Firstly, concerning the institutional setting, it is assumed that strong veto rights of the 
parliament in European policy-making increase the focus of debates on the course of action of 
the domestic government. The main argument for this assumption is that veto rights of 
parliaments relate primarily to the control and sanctioning of domestic governments, in 
relation to the provision of information and the adoption of mandates for negotiations in the 
EU Council. Although votes for the ratification of measures of EU crisis management 
arguably include a supranational component, they are also perceived mostly as an issue 
concerning the ability of national governments to maintain leadership and assume the support 
of its parliamentary majority. Against this background, it appears plausible to expect a 
polarization of the debate between the government majority and the parliamentary opposition 
rather than between representatives of the executive and parliamentarians, as the loyalty of the 
majority parties to the incumbent government trumps the institutional separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of government (for a more detailed discussion 
of this argument, cp. Auel/Benz 2005: 374-76).  
 
Secondly, the evolution of parliamentary debates is obviously influenced by the specific 
political constellation of parliamentary party groups in a given parliament. Taking up the 
previous point that criticism and debate of EU policies are most likely to evolve between the 
government majority and the parliamentary opposition, the evolution of this debate appears to 
depend greatly on the strength of ideological differences between both camps along two 
dimensions: Firstly, if the antagonism of government and opposition parties coincides with 
the polarization of parties in the left/right spectrum, the debate between both camps is likely 
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to involve questions relating to competing party ideologies along this dimension, namely, 
between proponents of “regulated capitalism versus neo-liberalismˮ (Hooghe et al. 2004). 
This effect is arguably strengthened in the presence of “policy-shapingˮ governments, as 
controversies emerge with regard to the question what propositions should be made by the 
incumbent government concerning the future course of European Monetary Union. Secondly, 
if the government/opposition divide coincides with a polarization of parties along the 
sovereignty/integration dimension – i.e., between proponents of deeper supranational 
integration and defenders of national sovereignty – the debate is more likely to involve 
questions relating to the development of supranational institutions and decision-making. As 
argued above, this effect is likely to be strengthened in the case of “policy takingˮ 
governments, as EU decision-making is mostly seen as a constraint of domestic politics rather 
than an emerging opportunity structure for the projection of national interests. Depending on 
the position of parties along these two ideological dimensions, the debate between the 
government majority and parliamentary opposition is therefore more or less likely to involve 
elements of both a left/right and pro-/anti-EU controversy.  
 
To summarize, the analysis presented in this paper considers three aspects of parliamentary 
debates about the EU debt crisis, which will be analyzed in comparative perspective: (1) 
firstly, controversies concerning government leadership in the conduct of EU policies, 
particularly the style and success of negotiation in the EU, the transparency of government 
action towards parliament, and the accountability of government representatives towards 
parliament. As discussed above, this aspect of debates is expected to be relatively strong in 
cases with a strong and proactive involvement of the executive in the resolution of the EU 
debt crisis, and strong parliamentary oversight; (2) secondly, a debate about competing party 
ideologies along the left/right dimension. This aspect is expected to emerge in a case of a 
strong involvement of government in the resolution of the debt crisis, in which the 
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government-opposition antagonism coincides with the position of parties along the left/right 
dimension; and (3) finally, controversies concerning the desirability of further supranational 
integration in relation to the principle of national sovereignty. As argued above, this element 
of the debate is likely to be strengthened through a receptive or detached role of the national 
government in the resolution of the debt crisis, and an existing polarization of government 
and opposition parties along the pro-/anti-EU dimension.  
 
Applied in a comparative perspective, this theoretical model suggests that different kinds of 
debate should emerge in the parliaments of the three countries compared here. Moreover, 
these three countries appear as ideal types of three different perspectives of parliamentary 
controversy on the resolution of the European debt crisis (compare also the overview of cases 
in table 1):  
 GERMANY AUSTRIA UNITED KINGDOM 
Role of 
Government 
Policy Shaper Policy Taker Fence Sitter 
Involvement of 
parliament 
Strong /  
Scrutiny Function 
Strong /  
Scrutiny Function 
Medium /  
Debating Function 
Party polarization Left / Right Sovereignty / 
Integration 
Left / Right +  
Sovereignty / Integration 
Expected focus of 
debate 






Table 1: Overview of cases.  
 
In the case of Germany, the government is both considerably affected by the potential costs of 
EU crisis management through its size and membership in the Eurozone, and considered a 
central player in the conduct of crisis management and the debate of future reforms of EMU. 
In this role, it is arguably one of the main “policy shapersˮ of the EU debt crisis. It is held 
accountable by a parliament with strong rights of information and oversight, combined with 
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ratification votes of the Bundestag for the adoption of rescue packages and the forthcoming 
European Stability Mechanism. The government is composed of a minimum-winning 
coalition of the center-right (composed of the Christian Democrat CDU and the liberal FDP) 
facing a parliamentary opposition of the center-left (composed of the Social Democrats, the 
Green Party, and the Left Party). Apart from the Left Party, the opposition parties however do 
not greatly diverge from the government parties with regard to their stance towards European 
integration, according to both qualitative analyses and quantitative data from the comparative 
party literature. This constellation of factors suggests the emergence of a debate that is 
relatively strongly focused on the leadership of the domestic government in the EU and 
includes elements of a debate between competing party ideologies in the left/right dimension. 
The sovereignty/integration dimension, however, is unlikely to emerge as a contested issue in 
the debate.  
 
The context of debates about the EU debt crisis in the Austrian Nationalrat differs from this 
first case in two respects. Firstly, although the government is equally affected by potential 
risks and payments for the conduct of crisis management, it is considered much less 
influential with regard to its influence on the substantive content of decision-making in the 
European Council. Due to its size and corresponding political influence, the country arguably 
appears more as a “policy takerˮ of decision-making at the EU level. Secondly, the 
antagonism between government and opposition does not coincide with the left/right 
polarization of parties, as the big-tent “Grand Coalitionˮ government (composed of the Social 
Democrat SPÖ and the Christian Democrat ÖVP) is opposed to parties both on the right 
(namely, the Freedom Party FPÖ and Alliance Future Austria, BZÖ) and the left (the Greens). 
Significant ideological differences, however, exist within the integration/sovereignty 
dimension between the clearly Euro-skeptic populist right parties FPÖ and BZÖ and the 
relatively EU-friendly government parties. A similarity to the first case is that parliamentary 
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oversight is equally strong, with the additional right of the Nationalrat to stage a referendum 
on questions of European integration – and therefore, an issue concerning the leadership of 
the domestic government in European affairs. These factors suggest that although issues of 
government leadership are likely to be prominent in the debates, the contestation of 
supranational integration is expected to be stronger and more prominent than in the German 
debate. A debate between party ideologies of the left and right, however, is likely to be less 
prominent in this case.  
 
Finally, the situation in the United Kingdom differs from the two other cases through the non-
membership of the country in the Eurozone. As the domestic government is both not directly 
affected by decisions and has much more restricted means of influencing them, it is likely to 
argue from the perspective of a relatively detached “fence sitter.ˮ Procedures of parliamentary 
oversight are also weaker in this case, as the executive does not need to be held accountable 
with regard to its participation in the EU rescue funds. With regard to the party political 
constellation, the incumbent coalition of Liberal Democrats and Conservatives differs from 
the opposing Labour Party both within the left/right and the integration/sovereignty 
dimension. Considering these factors, the debate is likely to focus much less on issues of 
government leadership and to relate to a much greater degree to questions of supranational 
integration. Given the ideological differences between Labour and Conservatives, the debate 
is likely to also involve some aspects of a left/right debate.  
 
Summing up, the theoretical model suggests comparative differences in the emergence of 
debates about government leadership (AUS > D > UK), left/right party ideology (D > UK > 
AUS) and supranational integration (UK > AUS > D). These assumptions will be tested in the 
empirical part of the paper.  
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3. Data and method 
Empirically, the paper is based on data gained from the computer-based manual coding of 
transcripts from the plenary debates of the Austrian Nationalrat, the British House of 
Commons, and the German Bundestag. The coding of these debates is part of a larger project 
dealing with the evolution of parliamentary debates about European integration (cp. Wendler 
2011a,b; 2012). For the present paper, a subset of debates directly dealing with the resolution 
of the European debt crisis was selected. The data set thus comprises 14 plenary debates (six 
from the Bundestag, four from the House of Commons and four from the Nationalrat, listed in 
more detail in annex 1), mostly debates following a statement or a longer declaration 
(Regierungserklärung) by a senior minister or the head of government. The selection of 
debates covers a time period from early 2010 to late 2011.  
 
The method applied for the analysis follows the approach of claims-making analysis, defining 
as its unit of analysis public speech acts expressing a justification or criticism of a political 
object or proposing a form of political action in a specific field (Koopmans/Statham 2010: 
53ff.). Using computer software for qualitative text analysis (Atlas.ti), claims are identified 
and marked from a review of the debate transcripts and then assigned to a thematic variable 
from a list (or “codebookˮ) of previously defined variables. For the present paper, the analysis 
was restricted to claims relating to four groups of variables, namely the assessment of (1) the 
European Union in general, (2) the EU policies of the domestic executive in general, (3) 
European Monetary Union and means of crisis management such as the EFSF and 
forthcoming European Stability Mechanism, (4) political actions of the domestic executive in 
the context of EMU and crisis management, and (5) statements referring to the positions or 
statements of other parliamentary parties or their representatives. For all four thematic areas, 
different variables were assigned to statements expressing a negative or positive assessment 
of the political object in question. Different data sets were used for each parliamentary party, 
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thus creating separate data files for each party. The complete data set comprises just over 
4500 claims.  
 
The output function of the computer software used for the coding procedure can be used both 
for quantitative analyses (using spreadsheets listing the amount of variables per party, 
thematic area and form of assessment) and qualitative content analysis (using an output 
function listing all claims coded with the same variable in a single document). These two sets 
of data are the basis for the empirical analysis of debates, presented in the next chapter.  
 
4. Empirical findings 
As announced in the introductory chapter, the empirical findings are presented in two steps: 
Firstly, a quantitative survey is given of the thematic structure of debates and to what degree 
they appear polarized between political parties (section 4.1.). Secondly, the three case studies 
are discussed through a more in-depth qualitative analysis of the key arguments exchanged in 
the debates (section 4.2.).  
 
4.1. Comparative survey 
The empirical analysis starts with a survey of the relative amount of the five types of claims 
discussed above in the parliamentary debates of the three countries under comparison. The 
results are shown in the diagram below, visualizing the relative percentage of claims in the 
five thematic domains discussed above in relation to all claims in the debates of the three 
countries compared, and the aggregate percentages for all cases combined.  
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Diagram 1: Thematic structure of debates about the resolution of the Eurozone crisis. The bars show the relative 
percentage of claims coded as addressing European integration in general (EUgen), national EU policy in 
general (NatPol_EU), European Monetary Union (EMU), national policy in the context of Monetary Union 
(NatPol_EMU), and claims relating to other parties in the parliamentary arena (Party_Political).  
 
Three observations can be made. Firstly, the diagram demonstrates that references to 
European Monetary Union feature very prominently in the debates analysed, as the two 
thematic categories linked to this topic (namely, claims coded in the categories EMU and 
NatPol_EMU) each make up between just under 20 and over 30 percent of all claims that 
were coded. Secondly, the overview lends some support to the assumption that the debate 
about the European debt crisis is most strongly focused on the role of the domestic 
government in Germany, somewhat less in Austria, and most clearly focused on supranational 
institutions and decisions in the UK. As the diagram shows, references to national policy 
towards EMU are much more frequent than claims about supranational decision-making in 
Germany, whereas data for the UK shows the inverse relation of claims and a roughly equal 
amount of claims for both levels in the case of Austria. Interestingly, this difference is not 
observed in a comparison of the references to the EU in general and national policy towards 
the EU in general (i.e., the categories abbreviated as EUgen and NatPol_EU), where the 
relative amount of claims for both levels is relatively similar in a comparison between 
countries. This suggests that the observation made above may be specific for debates about 
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European Monetary Union and the different country-specific perspectives on this policy-field 
that were discussed above. Thirdly, the debates include a significant amount of claims that 
were coded not as an assessment of European governance or government policy, but as 
primarily party political statements. This suggests that the debates contain a polarization 
between competing ideological viewpoints expressed by the political parties, either in the 
left/right or the sovereignty/integration dimension.  
 
This survey of thematic references only gives a partial impression of the political contestation 
of European Monetary Union – that is, to what degree different aspects of the debate are 
controversial and polarized in the debate between political parties. In a second step, therefore, 
the scatter plot shown below maps the position of parties both towards the supranational 
framework of EMU and national policies in the context of Monetary Union. Party positions in 
both dimensions were calculated as the relative amount of positive statements about both 
subjects coded in the debates.  
 
Diagram 2: Party positions within parliamentary debates about the resolution of the European debt crisis. Entries 
on both axes represent the percentage of positive claims made by the speakers of each party with regard to 
European Monetary Union (EMU, entries along the y-axis) and with regard to national policies and stances of 
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the domestic government in the context of European Monetary Union (NatPol_EMU, entries along the x-axis). 
In addition to individual parties, values have been entered for the percentage of positive claims of all parties in 
each country (represented by entries SUM_AUS, SUM_D, SUM_UK) and of all parties in the data set 
(SUM_ALL).  
 
Two main observations stand out. Firstly, the two clouds of entries in the upper-right and the 
lower-left part of the diagram suggests that both dimensions mapped in the diagram are 
contested between parliamentary parties. This suggests that both the supranational framework 
of EMU and national policies within this framework are indeed subjects of political debate in 
the three countries analysed. In this context, it is noteworthy that both clouds of entries are 
each exclusively composed of either parties in government (upper right quarter) or opposition 
parties (lower left), with only the British Conservatives taking an outlier position through the 
party`s distinctly more critical attitude towards EMU. This is an interesting observation, 
although it does not answer the question whether the debate between both camps concerns the 
issue of government leadership, ideological differences between left and right, or the 
appropriate balance between national sovereignty and supranational integration. Secondly, the 
overview again reveals some (mostly unsurprizing) country-specific differences. In this sense, 
the aggregate values for all parties in each of the three countries show the relatively positive 
attitude towards EMU in Germany and a clearly more critical one in Britain (where Labour 
and the Conservatives are almost on the same level with regard to their position), with Austria 
in an intermediate position. Party positions towards government policies in the context of 
EMU, however, appear equally polarized between government and opposition parties and are 
aligned on an almost straight vertical line (with Austria taking an outlier position to the left 
mainly due to the harshly critical attitude of the right-wing populist FPÖ and BZÖ towards 
the government`s position towards EMU).  
 
Does the polarization of parties with regard to European Monetary Union represent an 
extreme case of a highly contested debate, or is it reflected also in the broader stances of 
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parties towards European integration? In order to assess this question, a second scatter plot 
maps the position of parties towards European integration in general, and the government`s 
EU policy in general terms (assessed through the relative percentage of positive claims made 
by the speakers of each party).  
 
 
Diagram 3: Party positions within parliamentary debates about the resolution of the European debt crisis. Entries 
on both axes represent the percentage of positive claims made by the speakers of each party with regard to 
European integration in general (EUgen, entries along the y-axis) and with regard to national policies and 
stances of the domestic government in the context of European integration (NatPol_EU, entries along the x-
axis). In addition to individual parties, values have been entered for the percentage of positive claims of all 
parties in each country (represented by entries SUM_AUS, SUM_D, SUM_UK) and of all parties in the data set 
(SUM_ALL). 
 
Two observations can be made. Firstly, the debate on the general conduct of EU policies by 
each respective government is clearly polarized between parties in government (as shown by 
the entries on the right half of the diagram) and parties of the parliamentary opposition (as 
shown by the entries on the left). However, the positions of parties towards European 
integration in general do not appear to depend on their status as government or opposition 
party, revealing strong country-specific differences. In this sense, all German parties except 
for the Left Party hold relatively pro-EU positions above the 60-percent line, whereas both 
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major British parties hold considerably more Euro-skeptic views (entries below the 20-
percent mark). In Austria, a strong polarization of parties with regard to their general stance 
towards the EU is visible between the relatively pro-EU parties of the Grand Coalition (i.e., 
the ÖVP and SPÖ) on the one hand, and the clearly more Euroskeptic FPÖ and BZÖ as well 
as the Green Party. These observations confirm one of the assumptions discussed in the 
introductory part – namely, that the debate about the resolution of the European debt crisis 
takes place against the background of different forms of polarization of parties with regard to 
their general stance towards European integration.  
 
4.2. Case studies 
In order to get a clearer impression of parliamentary controversies about the resolution of the 
European debt crisis, the analysis proceeds with a qualitative review of the three case studies 
compared in this paper. These case studies are based on a review of all claims made about the 
evolution of European Monetary Union and national government policy in the context of 
EMU. These claims were summarized in separate documents for each parliamentary party and 
then summarized in two steps. Firstly, key arguments made in the debate were created from a 
review of the documents and claims assigned to these key arguments. Secondly, main focal 
points of the debate were identified from a comparison of the key arguments made in the 
debate. The following section proceeds by presenting the main focal points of debate and the 
key arguments made by political parties in the parliamentary debate. A detailed overview of 
thematic focal points and key arguments is listed at the end of the paper (annex 2).  
 
Germany: Contesting Leadership in the European Union 
A review of the debates in the Bundestag highlights two main thematic focal points of 
controversies about the resolution of the European debt crisis. The first one evolves mainly in 
a supranational frame of reference and concerns the contribution of Germany to the re-
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shaping and future development of the European Monetary Union. The key term of this 
debate is the idea of an emerging “Stability Unionˮ based on the normative principles of 
budget sustainability, Member State responsibility and justice in the distribution of risks and 
costs between public and private actors. This concept, which is forcefully proposed by 
speakers of the governing Christian Democrats, is contested by the opposition parties through 
the proposition of concepts of short- and mid-term crisis management that are more clearly 
based on ideas of solidarity and growth. Interestingly, this aspect of the debate is focused 
mainly on incentives of political action offered by the crisis – namely, the question of how to 
influence the future direction of EMU. In this sense, the crisis is explicitly interpreted as an 
opportunity to repair what is discussed as mistakes in the construction of the Euro – the 
epitome of this view is the proposition of “crisis as opportunityˮ (Krise als Chance). By 
contrast, the obvious constraints imposed on Germany by its very high contribution to the 
financing of the rescue mechanisms EFSF and ESM are not a prominent focal point in the 
debate and discussed mainly as “risksˮ that need to be taken against the background of the 
principle of responsible government. The second focal point evolves in a domestic frame of 
reference and concerns the style and legitimation of government leadership in the context of 
the evolving debt crisis. At this level, speakers of the government majority seek to establish a 
connection between their EU initiatives and the domestic policies adopted towards the goals 
of budget consolidation and the regulation of the financial sector. In contrast to this, 
particularly the Social Democrats criticize what they perceive as an nontransparent, 
contradictory, opportunistic and indecisive style of EU policy-making by the Federal 
government, something that is seen to damage Germany’s reputation in Europe and the 
resolution of the crisis. Criticism of the perceived lack of involvement of parliament in the 
preparation of deliberations of the European Council is also an important element of this part 
of the debate. Again, the crisis appears mainly as a (failed) opportunity of political leadership 
in European affairs rather than a constraint on political action.  
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Concerning the party political dimension, the debate about the first thematic focal point 
discussed above clearly reflects an ideological polarization of parties between left and right. 
In this sense, speakers of CDU and CSU stress the idea of stability and budget consolidation 
and reject steps towards a “transfer unionˮ such as Euro-Bonds, a banking license for the 
EFSF or a direct funding of state deficits through the ECB. Moreover, representatives of both 
the Christian Democratic Parties and the governing FDP blame the weakening of the Stability 
Pact on the behavior of the previous Red-Green government, thus detouring a criticism of an 
EU arrangement through the party political route. Speakers of the Social Democrats criticize 
the narrow focus of rescue mechanisms on austerity measures and ask for a strategy of growth 
for Southern European Member States, initiatives against unemployment, the introduction of 
conditional Euro-Bonds, a stronger regulation of the financial sector and more involvement 
by private debtors. These points are also taken up by speakers of the Green Party, who 
combine the criticism of strict austerity measures with a plea for a stronger coordination of 
economic and fiscal policies in the EU. The Left Party is most explicit in its criticism of the 
consequences of austerity measures in Greece and the distribution of costs between banks and 
tax payers in European countries. Here, the government is depicted as dependent on big 
banks. The second focal point appears mostly as a debate between government and opposition 
parties with far less ideological features. The main criticism brought forward by the SPD 
concerns the frequent changes of course of the Merkel government and its perceived lack of 
initiative to find a credible solution to the crisis. In this context, the government is criticized 
for shifting much of the responsibility for crisis management to the European Central Bank, 
thus endangering its independence. Speakers of the Green Party echo these points and 
criticize the failure to involve the Bundestag sufficiently. Equally, the Left Party attacks the 
“chaosˮ created by contradicting announcements by the government and the lack of 
transparency of forthcoming decisions. These arguments cannot be located at any point in the 
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left/right spectrum, but are typical points of contention between the ruling majority and 
parliamentary opposition.  
 
It remains to be added that a debate along the sovereignty-integration dimension is almost 
absent from the debate. None of the parties represented in the Bundestag seriously questions 
the existence of the Monetary Union or asks for its breakup or the exclusion of members. 
Only the Left Party shows some skepticism towards the appropriateness of the European 
rescue mechanism and is most explicit in its criticism of the “construction failuresˮ of 
European monetary Union. The debate between parties, however, is not about more or less 
integration, but about the direction the future course of integration should take, and how this 
should be pursued by the German government.  
 
Austria: Membership in the Monetary Union under Attack 
The debates of the Austrian Nationalrat show some similarities, but also some clear 
differences to the controversy in Germany. Again, two main thematic focal points can be 
identified. The first one concerns the distribution of the costs of the debt crisis and the future 
political regulation of European Monetary Union. As in the German case, this debate can be 
seen to evolve between the proponents of the principles of stability and budget consolidation 
on the one hand, and speakers arguing in favor of stricter regulation of the financial sector, a 
greater degree of involvement of private debtors and more growth-oriented crisis 
management, on the other. While this first debate evolves mainly between the ideologically 
moderate Social Democrats (SPÖ), the center-right People’s Party (ÖVP), and the 
environmentalist Green Party, a second, overall more predominant controversy is triggered by 
the right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) and Alliance Future Austria (BZÖ). These two 
parties challenge the participation of Austria both in the European rescue mechanisms and the 
Monetary Union by contesting the overall benefit of the country in both sets of arrangements, 
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prompting especially speakers affiliated to the incumbent “Grand Coalitionˮ to speak in favor 
of Austria’s membership in the Monetary Union. While this debate is almost exclusively 
framed in terms of economic costs and benefits, the role of the country and its government is 
mostly depicted as a “policy-takerˮ that either benefits from or suffers costs from the 
evolution of the common currency. In contrast to the German debate, the question of 
government leadership in the EU is not discussed as a major subject (except for ironic 
references of the Freedom Party to the allegedly weak chancellor). Through this second focal 
point, the debate is transformed in great parts to a controversy about the question of staying in 
or leaving European Monetary Union.  
 
In party political terms, two kinds of polarization emerge between parliamentary parties. The 
first, relatively weaker one evolves in a left/right dimension and concerns the distribution of 
costs and regulation of European Monetary Union. At this level of debate, the strong 
emphasis of speakers from the SPÖ on the government’s efforts to promote a stricter 
regulation of financial markets and to shield spending on education and social policies from 
budget cuts differs quite clearly from the argument made in favor of stability, debt reduction 
and budget consolidation by ÖVP speakers. Unsurprizingly, statements by speakers of the 
Green Party align themselves more closely with the Social Democrats by asking for strict 
regulation of financial markets, although the government record in this field is judged more 
critically. This debate, which shows strong similarities with discussions in Germany, is 
however complemented and superseded by the controversy about the benefits and costs of 
membership in European Monetary Union.  
 
United Kingdom: Debating the Future of European Monetary Union 
A quite different perspective on the evolution of the EU debt crisis is established within 
debates of the British House of Commons. The main difference to the two other cases is that 
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the discussion is firmly based on the almost completely consensual rejection of European 
Monetary Union as an economically flawed and politically over-centralized construction that 
Britain does not seek to join. Against this background, two focal points of contestation can be 
identified within the debates. Firstly, a rather large part of the debate concentrates on the 
question whether Britain should support the existing measures of crisis management and the 
continuation of European Monetary Union in its existing form because of its economic 
interdependence with the Eurozone (notwithstanding its own opt-out from it), or whether the 
current crisis is seen as an opportunity to ask for a fundamental change or break-up of existing 
arrangements. This debate therefore focuses mainly on supranational decisions and 
arrangements and questions the continuation of the current path of development of the 
Eurozone. Secondly, a somewhat less prominent aspect of the debate relates to the defense of 
British interests by the incumbent government, particularly with regard to the involvement in 
the (potential) payment of crisis management and the question whether the country is 
marginalized through the increasing integration of the Eurozone. This aspect is more clearly 
focused on the issue of government leadership, although this issue is more strongly linked 
with the questioning of the country’s involvement in supranational integration than in the 
German debate.  
 
Interestingly, in party political terms particularly the first of these two debates is not neatly 
polarized between the Labour Party and Conservatives, but can be seen to emerge across and 
within both parties (with a separate but quite marginal position of the Liberal Democrats). 
Concerning the party political dimension, the debate therefore evolves less as a debate 
between two monolithic parliamentary party groups but mostly between speakers of the Front 
Benches and the parliamentary back bench. In this sense, both speakers of the Conservative 
and Labour parties point out that a stabilization of EMU is in the British interest due to the 
country’s economic interdependence with the Eurozone countries. Both the establishment of 
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European rescue funds and a stricter enforcement of stability rules are therefore supported on 
both sides of parliament. Equally frequent, however, are claims from speakers of both parties 
that are very critical of crisis management in the Eurozone, characterizing it as an “extend and 
pretend policyˮ and an act of “throwing good money after bad.ˮ Against this background, 
several speakers of the Labour Party openly argue for a break-up of the Eurozone in its 
current form, in the sense of creating a smaller hard-currency zone without the Southern 
European Member States; a closer monetary cooperation between Britain and post-Euro 
Ireland is also discussed. While clearly focused on the question of supranational integration – 
whether Britain should pragmatically support or help to break up the Eurozone in its current 
form – this debate does not take up competing ideological convictions of the two main parties 
within the left/right spectrum. The corresponding debate between proponents of “stabilityˮ 
and “growthˮ or “solidarityˮ is much less present in the British debate.  
 
The second focal point of debates – the defense of British interests in the EU – is more clearly 
polarized between the governing Conservatives and the Labour Party. Here, the main 
argument proposed by the Conservatives is that the existing financial involvement of Britain 
in the European rescue funds – through its involvement in the EFSM – is an inheritance from 
the previous Labour Party now successfully contained by the incumbent government through 
the quick transition to the ESM. By contrast, speakers of the Labour Party criticize the 
marginalization of the British government through the increasing integration of Eurozone 
countries and the lack of an efficient government strategy to advance British interests in the 
reform of EMU. While this debate has more typical characteristics of a debate about 
government leadership, it is equally neutral with regard to the left/right dimension of party 
politics. In this context, government leadership is also discussed primarily with regard to its 
impact on supranational decisions and developments, and only very partly with regard to the 
involvement of parliament or domestic issues. Taken together, these observations confirm that 
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the debate in the British House of Commons is most clearly focused on the issue of 
supranational integration among the three cases compared here.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The comparison of three cases of parliamentary debate about the European debt crisis in this 
paper elucidates the different perspectives through which the current state and future direction 
of European Monetary Union is discussed in the three Member States compared. 
Distinguishing three different focal points of debates – controversies about government 
leadership, competing party ideologies and supranational integration – both the quantitative 
survey and the case studies show substantially different thematic structures and forms of party 
political controversy in the debates analysed. In this sense, it was shown that the supranational 
environment in which governments act in the context of the Euro crisis appears to shape the 
direction of parliamentary debate: In this sense, particularly the German but also the Austrian 
debate appear quite strongly focused on the issue of government leadership, whereas the 
British debate presents itself mostly as a controversy about supranational integration. 
Moreover, the structure of the party system and constellation of parties in government and the 
parliamentary opposition have been shown to play an additional role, as the German debate 
includes much more substantial elements of a debate between competing party ideologies 
between left and right than the Austrian case, where the issue of supranational integration is 
more present through the antagonism between the clearly Euro-skeptic populist right parties 
and the incumbent Grand Coalition. The British debate represents a special case in the sense 
that instead of a polarization between party groups, the debate evolves between front and 
backbenchers of both main parties rather than between parties. This aspect is explained both 
by internal splits within both parties with regard to European integration and the more open 
and antagonistic style of parliamentary interaction.  
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Overall, the theoretical model developed at the beginning of the paper has proven useful to 
analyze the observed differences between the three cases. Given the relatively high number of 
variables and the small number of cases, the model is used here mainly as a framework for a 
theoretically informed interpretation of the three cases instead of a rigorous test of causal 
explanations. In this sense, more research needs to be done to explore the respective relevance 
of the three main variables and their interaction. This could be done by increasing the number 
of cases or providing more cases studies about other aspects of EU governance through which 
more variation of explanatory variables can be included. A basic observation, however, is that 
while parliamentary disputes about the future development of European Monetary Union are 
an indication of a “politicizationˮ of EU governance, the debates establish substantially 
different focal points of political debate and contestation, meriting closer attention both by 
researchers and European citizens. 
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Annex 1: List of parliamentary debates analysed 
 
Austria (Nationalrat der Republik Österreich, XXIV. Gesetzgebungsperiode) 
 
- Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers und des Vizekanzlers (...) zur Erörterung der Frage der 
Stabilisierung der gemeinsamen europäischen Währung und den Lehren aus der 
Griechenland-Krise und Durchführung einer Debatte gemäß 74b der 
Geschäftsordnung, 66. Sitzung, 19 May 2010 (transcript pp. 24-75) 
- Aktuelle Stunde (24.) – Aktuelle Europastunde: „Kein Euro-Haftungsschirm ohne 
Volksabstimmung, Herr Bundeskanzler“, 93. Sitzung, 20 January 2011 (transcript pp. 
56-76) 
- Aktuelle Stunde (26.): „Kein Euro-Haftungsschirm ohne Volksabstimmung, Herr 
Bundeskanzler“, 99. Sitzung, 30 March 2011 (transcript pp. 22-42) 
- EU-Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers sowie des Vizekanzlers gemäß §74b der 
Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates am 9. 
Dezember 2011, 139. Sitzung, 14 December 2011(transcript pages 12-58) 
 
Germany (Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Legislaturperiode) 
 
- Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung durch die Bundeskanzlerin: zum Europäischen Rat 
am 25./26. März 2010 in Brüssel, 34. Sitzung, 25 March 2010 (transcript pages 3093 
D- 3117B) 
- Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung durch die Bundeskanzlerin: zu den Maßnahmen 
zur Stabilisierung des Euro, 42. Sitzung, 19 May 2010 (transcript pages 4125 B – 
4155A) 
- Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung durch die Bundeskanzlerin: zum Europäischen Rat 
am 16./17. Dezember 2010 in Brüssel, 80. Sitzung, 15 December 2010 (transcript 
pages 8817 A – 8836 C) 
- Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung durch den Bundesminister der Finanzen: Stabilität 
der Euro-Zone sichern – Reformkurs in Griechenland vorantreiben, 115. Sitzung, 10 
June 2011 (transcript pages 13207B – 13229 D) 
- Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung durch die Bundeskanzlerin: zum Europäischen Rat 
und zum Eurogipfel am 26. Oktober 2011 in Brüssel, 135. Sitzung, 26 October 2011 
(transcript pages 15949 B-15974A) 
- Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung durch die Bundeskanzlerin zu den Ergebnissen des 
Europäischen Rates am 8./9. Dezember 2011 in Brüssel, 148. Sitzung, 14 December 
2011 (transcript pages 17682 B – 17705 C) 
 
United Kingdom (House of Commons, 55th Parliament) 
 
- Debate on European Affairs, 3 June 2010, Volume 510, Part No. 9, Column 600 – 687 
- Debate on European Union (Amendment) Act 2008, 16 March 2011, Volume 525, 
Part No. 133, Column 421 – 444 
- Debate on the Eurozone Crisis, 27 October 2011, Volume 534, Part No. 215, Column 
469 – 490 




Annex 2: Focal points and key arguments  
 




Focal Point 1: Future direction of European Monetary Union 
 
Key Arguments (with amount of claims): 
 
- CDU/CSU: plea for Stability Union (72), balance between responsibility and solidarity (32), strength of 
the Euro (36), deficits in construction of EMU (25) 
- FDP: Maintenance of the Stability Pact (8), link solidarity-responsibility (5) 
- SPD: Lack of growth strategy (19), lack of effective crisis management (22) 
- GRÜNE: Need for economic governance (9) and greater involvement of private sector (5), support for 
crisis management (5) 
- LINKE: social imbalance of measures (23), consequences of austerity measures in Greece (13) 
 
Focal Point 2: Government leadership during the EU debt crisis 
 
Key Arguments (with amount of claims): 
 
- CDU/CSU: responsible management of risks (20), case for austerity measures in Germany (27), case 
against „transfer union“ (20) 
- FDP: stance against „transfer union“ (11), adherence of govt to stability rules (24) 
- SPD: lack of credibility and consistency of govt policy (65), lack of engagement by govt for regulation 
of financial sector (17) 
- GRÜNE: lacking involvement of parliament (5), lack of engagement by govt for regulation of financial 
sector and involvement of private debtors (24) 
- LINKE: critique of govt policy towards financial and private sector (14), critique of domestic economic 




Focal Point 1: Costs and benefits of Austrian membership in EMU 
 
Key arguments (with amount of claims): 
 
- SPÖ: Economic and social benefits of Euro membership for Austria (31), protection against speculative 
attacks (10), necessity of rescue measures (18) 
- ÖVP: Economic and social benefits of Euro membership for Austria (31), protection against speculative 
attacks (13), support for stability concept (18) 
- FPÖ: Loss of taxpayer money through rescue funds (19), EMU as weak and economically flawed 
construction (34) 
- BZÖ: circularity and failure of rescue measures (14), rejection of EMU (4) 
- GRÜNE: necessity of rescue measures (14) 
 
Focal Point 2: Distribution of costs of EMU crisis management between social groups 
 
Key arguments (with amount of claims): 
 
- SPÖ: Govt initiatives for regulation of financial sector and involvement of private debtors (21), socially 
balanced conduct of austerity policies (18) 
- ÖVP: Stability as socially just policy (27), govt initiatives for regulation of financial sector (6) 
- FPÖ: bias of rescue measures in favor of banks and finance sector / no use for ordinary citizens (18), 
burden for taxpayers (9) 
- BZÖ: burden on taxpayers through rescue measures and austerity (12) 
- GRÜNE: lacking regulation of financial sector (17) and initiatives for growth (5) 
United Kingdom 
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Focal Point 1: Support for stabilisation or break up EMU in its current form 
 
Key arguments:  
 
- Conservative: British interest in stabilisation of Eurozone (35), rejection of rescue measures (42), 
fundamental rejection of EMU (54) 
- Labour: British interest in stabilisation of Eurozone (21), fundamental rejection of EMU (30), rejection 
of rescue measures (32), plea for breakup of EMU (15) 
- Liberal Democrat: necessity of Euro stabilisation and rescue measures (5) 
 
Focal Point 2: Defense of British interests in the EU 
 
Key arguments:  
 
- Conservative: British detachment from rescue funds (28), British involvement in EFSM as inherited 
from Labour (12), critique of British support for/failure to act against establishment of EFSF and ESM 
(22) 
- Labour: marginalisation of British government in the EU (18), lack of govt initiative for establishment 
of ESM (and hence, dissolution of EFSM, 5) 
- Liberal Democrat: Necessity of Euro stabilisation measures (6) 
  
 
 
